Disagreements Between Different Religions And Cultures

There is no plausible policy of conciliation that requires that religious faith be abandoned in the face of disagreement. Plausible policy requires religious skepticism only if one`s own religious convictions are challenged by a sufficiently large and qualified contingent of individuals. The complete argument that religious differences will overcome a certain religious belief must do more than simply affirm that faith is contested; it must affirm that the degree of divergence is so important that a good vision of differences of opinion requires the abandonment of faith. This is the after-the-fact phase of the argument that has received little attention, although it is far from trivial. Let us look at the impact of the distribution of opinion on the existence of God. A 2010 Ipsos survey of more than 18,000 adults in 23 countries showed that 51% of respondents said they believed in at least one God or the “supreme creature”, 17% of them sometimes said they were believers and sometimes did not believe, 13% declared themselves insurgents, and 18% of them said they did not believe in any kind of being divine. These percentages vary only slightly between different levels of education. The epistemic importation of these data is far from clear. Kelly (2011) suggests that the fact that the theistic faith is far more widespread than the atheist faith is proof that theism is at least easily supported. But some proponents of religious skepticism may argue that the exact proportions are not very significant and that what is episterically significant is the lack of consensus. Moreover, many believe that the beliefs of the population as a whole are much less important than the convictions of those with appropriate expertise. And atheism is the dominant position in some communities of experts. For example, a large 2009 survey of professional philosophers conducted by Bourget and Chalmers in 99 leading departments showed that 73% of professional philosophers accepted or tended to accept atheism, while only 15% accepted or tended to accept theism.

On the other hand, most philosophers specializing in religious philosophy were theists, 72% accepting or leaning at theism, and only 19% accepted or incended atheism. Draper and Nichols (2013) argue that scholars of religious philosophy are largely influenced by pro-religious prejudices, an assertion that, if true, might greatly reduce the epistem paddized significance of the celebrity of the theistic faith among religious philosophers. There is no doubt that some theists might counter the fact that certain selection effects and antithetical prejudices in the broader professional culture of philosophy help to explain the importance of atheism among philosophers as a whole. In any case, many religious believers would challenge the idea that philosophical expertise is the primary qualification for reliably assessing religious issues (see section 4). Of course, anyone who tries to measure the degree of qualified opposition to a certain religious perspective must address several sensitive and controversial issues. Alain de Botton, philosopher and author of Religion for Atheists, is concerned about fundamentalism. “Saying something like `I`m an atheist: I think religions aren`t all bad` is a dramatically strange thing to say, he told British journalist Bryan Appleyard in 2012. When you say it on the Internet, you get ferocious messages calling you a fascist, an idiot or an idiot. This is a very strange moment in our culture.

The presentation of these examples should not indicate the perfect or ideal biopsychosocial evaluation document.